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Abstract	
In	 the	 June	 2016	 EU	 Referendum,	 Wales	 voted	 to	 leave	 the	 EU	 -	 in	 the	 face	 of	 strong	 political	
support	to	remain.	Whilst	Wales’s	vote	puts	it	on	the	‘winning’	Leave	side,	the	process	of	leaving	the	
EU	will	bring	with	it	some	tangible	losses	that	will	impact	Wales	differently	from	the	rest	of	the	UK.	
In	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	vote,	there	was	widespread	consternation	about	why	Wales,	as	a	
net	beneficiary	due	to	significant	receipts	of	European	Structural	and	Investment	Funds,	would	see	a	
majority	 vote	 Leave.	The	 reasons	behind	 this,	 and	also	 the	potential	 for	a	new	 regional	policy	are	
discussed	 in	 this	 article.	 In	 addition,	 it	 looks	 at	 a	 possible	 ‘win’	 for	 Wales	 with	 the	 potential	
expansion	in	regulatory	competence	which	may	come	from	the	repatriation	of	competences	back	to	
the	devolved	administrations	on	Brexit,	though	recognising	that	this	may	not	be	straightforward	and	
may	carry	a	heavy	price	tag.	
	
 
 
In	a	referendum	on	23	June	2016,	the	UK	voted	to	leave	the	European	Union	(EU).	With	a	turnout	of	
72.2	per	cent,	 the	UK-wide	result	was	51.9	per	cent	Leave	to	48.1	per	cent	Remain.	The	people	of	
the	 UK	 had	 spoken.	 However,	 they	 had	 not	 spoken	 with	 one	 voice.	 Indeed,	 the	 territorial	
differentiation	 that	 characterises	 the	 UK’s	 relationship	 with	 the	 EU	 was	 itself	 reflected	 in	 the	
outcome	 of	 the	 referendum,	 with	 distinct	 results	 returned	 in	 the	 four	 nations	 of	 the	 UK.	 Rather	
unsurprisingly,	Scotland	and	Northern	Ireland	voted	Remain	(the	former	more	convincingly	than	the	
latter)	and	England	voted	Leave.	Wales,	however,	proved	a	rather	intriguing	case.	In	defiance	of	the	
near	universal	support	for	EU	membership	from	the	political	elite	and	sectoral	bodies	across	Wales,	
the	final	Welsh	vote	stood	at	52.5	per	cent	Leave	to	47.5	per	cent	Remain,	on	a	turnout	of	71.6	per	
cent.	As	such,	Wales	positioned	itself	apart	from	the	other	devolved	nations	and	was	on	the	‘winning	
side’	of	the	UK’s	EU	Referendum.	
The	wheels	have	now	been	set	 in	motion	for	the	UK’s	exit	 from	the	EU.	Formal	negotiations,	once	
they	commence	following	the	triggering	of	Article	50	TEU,	will	reflect	the	status	of	the	UK	as	a	single	
entity.	 However,	 the	 process	 and	 outcome	 of	 these	 negotiations	 will	 play	 out	 on	 multiple	 levels	
across	 the	 UK.	 There	 is,	 after	 all,	 not	 just	 one	 singular	 relationship	 at	 stake	 in	 the	 negotiations.	
Instead,	there	will	be	consequences	for	the	multiple	relationships	that	exist	between	the	EU	and	the	
UK’s	 devolved	 nations,	 relationships	 that	 play	 out	 along	 financial,	 economic,	 legal,	 political	 and	
cultural	lines.	The	UK’s	exit	from	the	EU	will	also	have	knock-on	implications	for	the	future	union	of	
the	 four	 nations	 of	 the	 UK,	 both	 politically	 and	 constitutionally	 (Minto,	 Hunt,	 Keating,	McGowan	
2016;	Douglas-Scott	2015).	
Whilst	opinions	may	differ	about	the	prospects	for	Wales,	and	the	rest	of	the	UK,	outside	the	EU,	the	
referendum	campaign	saw	the	Welsh	Labour	Government	support	 remaining	 in.	On	24	June	2016,	
the	First	Minister	of	Wales	announced	his	 ‘deep	disappointment’	with	 the	 referendum	result,	 and	
outlined	the	six	priorities	for	protecting	Welsh	interests	post	Brexit.	First	 is	 job	protection,	and	the	
maintenance	 of	 economic	 confidence	 and	 stability.	 Access	 to	 the	 single	market	 is	 seen	 as	 ‘vital’,1	
along	with	 continued	 participation	 until	 at	 least	 2020	 in	 the	 EU	 funding	 programmes	which	 have	
seen	Wales	as	a	net	beneficiary	of	EU	money.	Looking	ahead,	a	new	financial	settlement	within	the	
UK	 is	 demanded,	 along	with	 the	 placing	 of	 the	Devolved	Administrations	 ‘on	 an	 entirely	 different	
footing’	 in	 the	 constitutional	 order	 of	 the	UK.	 He	 called	 too	 for	Wales	 to	 be	 fully	 involved	 in	 the	
discussions	on	the	terms	of	withdrawal	(Welsh	Government	2016a).	
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Shortly	after	the	Referendum,	the	newly	installed	Prime	Minister	Theresa	May	stressed	that	she	was	
seeking	 a	UK	 approach	 to	 negotiations	 (May,	 J.	 2016)	 and	made	 early	moves	 to	 substantiate	 this	
commitment,	with	Prime	Ministerial	visits	 to	Edinburgh,	Belfast	and	Cardiff	during	the	summer	for	
meetings	with	the	leaders	of	the	devolved	nations.	Since	then,	however,	hopes	of	a	more	inclusive	
negotiating	position	have	diminished.	More	recent	proclamations	of	 ‘one	United	Kingdom’	and	the	
spectre	of	 ‘divisive	nationalism’	 (May,	T.	2016)	 raise	serious	doubts	about	 the	 level	of	 inclusion	of	
the	devolved	nations	 in	 the	negotiating	process,	 as	 does	 the	exclusion	of	 the	 Scottish,	Welsh	 and	
Northern	 Irish	 Ministers	 from	 a	 permanent	 seat	 on	 the	 Government’s	 European	 Union	 Exit	 and	
Trade	Committee.	Of	course,	how	this	will	play	out	 in	practice	remains	to	be	seen.	Notably,	unlike	
Scotland	and	Northern	Ireland,	Wales	voted	to	leave	the	European	Union.	However	uncomfortable	a	
prospect,	the	broadly	pro-European	political	elite	must	contend	with	this	result	and	ensure	that	it	is	
reflected	 in	 the	 line	 the	 Welsh	 Government	 and	 Assembly	 advance	 in	 the	 negotiations	 ahead,	
negotiations	which	will	take	place	both	within	and	beyond	the	UK.		
Following	this	introduction,	in	a	first	section,	the	article	presents	the	particular	position	of	Wales,	as	
a	small	nation	within	two	unions,	and	highlights	the	distinctive	features	of	this	Wales-UK	and	Wales-
EU	 relationship,	 providing	 an	 initial	 take	 on	 the	 reasons	 behind	 the	 vote	 to	 leave.	Whilst	Wales’s	
vote	puts	it	on	the	‘winning’	Leave	side,	the	process	of	leaving	the	EU	will	bring	with	it	some	tangible	
losses	that	will	impact	Wales	differently	from	the	rest	of	the	UK.	In	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	
vote,	there	was	widespread	consternation	about	why	Wales,	as	a	net	beneficiary	due	to	significant	
receipts	of	European	Structural	and	Investment	Funds	(ESIF),	would	see	a	majority	vote	Leave.	This	is	
considered	 in	more	 detail	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 before	 a	 final	 section	 looks	 at	 a	 possible	 ‘win’	 for	
Wales	 with	 the	 expansion	 in	 regulatory	 competence	 which	 may	 come	 from	 Brexit,	 though	
recognising	that	this	may	have	a	price	tag.		
 
WALES	IN	THE	UK	AND	THE	EU	AND	THE	VOTE	TO	LEAVE	
In	 some	 ways,	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 EU	 Referendum	 in	Wales	 was	 not	 surprising,	 being	 as	 it	 was	
broadly	in	line	with	the	polling	data	for	the	couple	of	years	preceding	the	vote	(Scully	2016).	In	other	
ways,	however,	Wales’s	vote	to	leave	was	remarkable.	This	left-leaning,	small	nation,	which	benefits	
financially	 from	 EU	 membership,	 had	 long	 been	 seen	 as	 pro-European	 (Wyn	 Jones	 and	 Rumbul	
2012).	Wales	 had	 supported	 the	 UK’s	 membership	 of	 the	 European	 Economic	 Community	 in	 the	
1975	 Referendum2	 and,	 since	 this	 time,	 the	 developing	 EU	 context	 had	 served	 to	 bolster	 Wales	
financially,	 economically	 and	 also	 as	 a	 distinct	 international	 actor.	 Indeed,	 the	 EU	 has	 a	 notable	
impact	on	Wales	on	a	number	of	fronts:	legal	and	political,	cultural,	financial	and	economic.	
The	history	of	Wales’s	membership	of	the	EU	is	now	indivisible	from	the	story	of	devolution	in	the	
UK,	which	 entered	 a	 new	phase	 following	 the	 coming	 to	 power	 of	 the	UK	 Labour	Government	 in	
1997.	 Following	 a	 referendum	 in	 that	 year,	 narrowly	 in	 favour	 (50.3	 per	 cent),	 a	 devolved	Welsh	
Assembly	 was	 established.	 The	 Assembly	 and	 machinery	 of	 government	 has	 been	 in	 a	 state	 of	
constant	 development	 since	 then,	 with	 successive	 expansion	 of	 powers.	 These	 processes	 of	
devolution	have	unfolded	 against	 the	background	of	 EU	membership	 (Cole	 and	Palmer	 2011)	 and	
the	Welsh	political	architecture	has	been	developed	within	the	context	of	two	unions	–	the	UK	and	
the	EU.	Devolution	in	the	UK	is	asymmetric,	with	a	different	model	and	a	different	scope	of	devolved	
powers	operating	across	each	of	the	devolved	nations.	Unlike	Scotland	and	Northern	Ireland,	Wales	
has	to	date	had	a	‘conferred’	model	of	devolution,	under	which	the	legislative	Assembly	may	adopt	
laws	in	those	areas	conferred	on	it	under	the	Government	of	Wales	Act	2006,	Schedule	7.	This	model	
will	be	replaced	with	the	reserved	powers	model	seen	in	Scotland	and	Northern	Ireland,	when	the	
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most	recent	(highly	contested)	Wales	Bill	finishes	its	passage	through	Parliament	and	receives	Royal	
Assent	 (Parliament,	 UK	 2016)	 (which	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 in	 early	 2017).	 Under	 this	 model,	 the	Welsh	
Assembly	 will	 have	 competence	 to	 legislate	 on	 all	 such	 matters	 as	 are	 not	 reserved	 to	 the	
Westminster	 Parliament.	 The	 continuing	 sovereignty	 of	 Parliament	 connects	 all	 three	 models	 of	
devolution,	though	a	constitutional	convention	operates	that	Westminster	will	not	normally	legislate	
on	a	devolved	matter	without	consent	of	the	relevant	devolved	parliament.	This	Sewel	Convention	
has	 been	 incorporated	 into	 the	 Scotland	 Act	 and	 a	 comparable	 provision	 is	 foreseen	 in	 the	 new	
Wales	 Act.	 Current	 areas	 devolved	 to	 Wales	 include	 agriculture,	 economic	 development,	 health,	
education,	 housing	 and	 the	 environment.	 Structures	 for	 policy	 coordination	 across	 the	 UK	 are	 in	
place	 (though	 their	 effectiveness	 is	 open	 to	 question),	 and	 are	 centred	 on	 Joint	 Ministerial	
Committees	 which	 operate	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 a	 Memorandum	 of	 Understanding.	 Public	
spending	 on	matters	 for	which	 the	 devolved	 administrations	 are	 responsible	 is	 underpinned	 by	 a	
block	grant	made	to	the	devolved	nations	from	the	Treasury,	the	 level	determined	in	 line	with	the	
Barnett	formula,	as	well	as	from	EU	funds.		
A	number	of	the	policy	areas	which	have	been	devolved	to	Wales	also	fall	under	EU	competence.	As	
such,	 these	 devolved	powers	 are	 exercised	within	 a	 framework	provided	by	 EU	 law,	which	places	
both	 shaping	 and	 limiting	 effects	 on	Welsh	 law.	 Of	 course,	 the	 EU	 also	 has	 an	 impact	 on	Wales	
beyond	areas	of	devolved	competence,	and	in	some	cases	this	impact	is	quite	distinctive.	Indeed,	EU	
law	and	policy	(whether	 in	devolved	or	non-devolved	areas)	plays	out	 in	a	particular	way	 in	Wales	
given	its	size,	the	nature	of	its	key	industries	and	its	socio-economic	make-up.	Reflecting	this	distinct	
‘regional’	impact	of	the	EU	are	the	multiple	channels	through	which	the	particular	interests	of	Wales	
can	 be	 promoted	 at	 the	 EU	 level.	 The	 EU	 institutions	 themselves	 make	 provision	 for	 the	
representation	 of	 Wales.	 Wales	 has	 four	 Members	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament,	 and	 has	
representation	on	the	Committee	of	the	Regions	and	the	European	Economic	and	Social	Committee.	
There	are	also	individuals	from	Wales	and	seconded	experts	from	the	Welsh	Government	working	as	
officials	 in	 the	 EU	 institutions.	 Beyond	 this,	 Wales	 has	 established	 its	 own	 outpost	 in	 Brussels	 –	
Wales	House	–	that	seeks	to	protect	and	promote	the	interests	of	Wales	in	the	EU.	This	is	home	to	
the	 Welsh	 Government	 EU	 Office,	 the	 National	 Assembly	 for	 Wales	 EU	 Office,	 the	 Welsh	 Local	
Government	Association	(WLGA)	EU	Office,	and	the	Welsh	Higher	Education	Brussels	(WHEB)	Office.	
In	addition	to	this,	there	is	an	extensive	range	of	networks	 in	which	Wales	 is	represented,	through	
the	 participation	 of	 the	 Welsh	 Government,	 the	 National	 Assembly,	 WLGA,	 WHEB	 and	 other	
organisations,	e.g.	the	Arts	Council	for	Wales	and	the	Welsh	Council	for	Voluntary	Action.		
As	will	be	seen	in	more	detail	in	the	final	section,	the	prospect	of	removing	the	framework	provided	
by	EU	law	raises	significant	questions	around	competence,	capacity	and	intra-UK	relations.	Another	
feature	of	this	dual	framework	has	been	cultural.	As	highlighted	above,	the	institutional	architecture	
of	the	EU	has	provided	structures	and	networks	through	which	Wales	has	asserted	itself	as	a	distinct	
European	nation.	In	addition	to	its	importance	to	policy	formation,	this	has	been	significant	for	the	
Welsh	 identity	both	within	and	beyond	the	UK.	 Indeed,	 in	providing	the	background	against	which	
Wales	has	profiled	its	distinctive	identity,	the	EU	has	accommodated	a	‘soft’	Welsh	nationalism.3	This	
goes	some	way	to	explaining	the	conventional	association	of	Wales	with	a	pro-Europeanism.		
This	pro-Europeanism	is	shared	by	the	majority	of	the	political	elite	in	Wales.	Indeed,	out	of	the	60	
Assembly	Members	(AMs),	the	vast	majority	supported	the	UK’s	continued	membership	of	the	EU.	
There	was	 a	 vocal	minority	who	 supported	 Leave,	 notably	 the	 seven	 recently	 installed	 UKIP	 AMs	
(new	 additions	 to	 the	 Assembly	 with	 the	 elections	 on	 5	May	 2016)	 and	 the	 leader	 of	 the	Welsh	
Conservatives,	Andrew	RT	Davies.	 The	broad	 sweep,	however,	was	 firmly	pro-EU.	 Labour	has	 long	
been	the	dominant	party	in	Wales,	both	in	the	Assembly	(currently	with	29	AMs)	and	at	Westminster	
(currently	with	 25	 out	 of	 40	Welsh	MPs).	 In	 the	 run	 up	 to	 the	 EU	 referendum,	 the	 Labour	Welsh	
Government	 was	 unwavering	 in	 articulating	 that	 there	 are	 clear	 benefits	 to	 Wales	 of	 EU	
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membership,	with	the	First	Minister	stating	in	a	BBC	interview	in	June	2015	that	a	vote	to	leave	the	
EU	 would	 be	 ‘catastrophic’	 for	 Wales	 (BBC	 News	 2015).	 Plaid	 Cymru	 (the	 Party	 of	 Wales)	 also	
adopted	 a	 clear	 pro-EU	 stance.	 Furthermore,	 along	with	 the	 Scottish	 National	 Party,	 Plaid	 Cymru	
supported	 a	 devolution	 lock	 on	 the	 final	 referendum	 outcome,	 whereby	 a	 vote	 to	 leave	 the	 EU	
would	only	be	valid	if	this	result	was	returned	across	the	four	nations.	
A	particularly	 striking	 feature	of	 the	EU	Referendum	 in	Wales	 is	 the	clear	disconnect	between	 the	
electorate’s	 vote	 to	 leave	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 overwhelming	 support	 for	 the	 UK’s	 continued	 EU	
membership	 from	 the	 political	 elite	 and	 sectoral	 interest	 groups	 across	 Wales.	 Of	 the	 22	 local	
authority	 areas	 in	 Wales,	 17	 voted	 Leave.	 These	 included	 those	 areas	 represented	 by	 the	 First	
Minister	 Carwyn	 Jones	 and	 Plaid	 Cymru	 Leader	 Leanne	 Wood.	 A	 number	 of	 factors	 have	 been	
advanced	to	explain	this	contrast	between	the	political	classes	and	the	Welsh	public	in	their	support	
for	 the	EU	 (see	O’Hagan	2016;	Wyn-Jones	2016).	 First,	 there	are	particular	 challenges	attached	 to	
disseminating	a	distinct	Welsh	narrative	about	EU	membership.	In	part,	this	is	due	to	the	dominance	
of	 London-based	 media	 in	 Wales.	 These	 media	 outlets	 are	 broadly	 insensitive	 to	 territorial	
differentiation	within	the	UK,	therefore	providing	no	room	for	addressing	the	specific	case	of	Wales	
and	 the	EU.	 Secondly,	 the	EU	Referendum	came	hot	on	 the	heels	of	 the	Assembly	elections;	 they	
were	held	only	 seven	weeks	apart.	Therefore,	 there	was	a	 certain	amount	of	 fatigue	amongst	 the	
political	activists,	who	had	invested	heavily	in	campaigning	around	the	National	Assembly	elections	
and	who	were	simply	too	tired	to	begin	campaigning	anew	with	the	same	level	of	vigour.	Finally,	it	is	
considered	 that	 (much	 like	 the	 Leave	 result	 across	 England)	many	 voters	 in	Wales	were	 casting	 a	
vote	against	the	status	quo.	Whilst	key	arguments	of	the	Leave	campaign	resonated	amongst	Welsh	
voters	 (such	 as	 immigration	 and	 budget	 contributions),	 to	 some	 extent	 the	 EU	 was	 seen	 as	 the	
embodiment	 of	 the	 distant,	 unaccountable	 political	 elite	 and	 this	was	 a	 key	 factor	 in	 their	 voting	
choice.		
Central	to	much	of	the	pro-EU,	Wales-specific	narrative	has	been	the	financial	and	economic	impact	
of	 EU	 membership.	 Financially,	 unlike	 the	 UK	 as	 a	 whole,	 Wales	 is	 a	 net	 recipient	 of	 EU	 funds,	
predominantly	 through	 Common	 Agricultural	 Policy	 (CAP)	 payments	 and	 European	 Structural	 and	
Investment	 Funds	 (ESIF).	 A	 crucial	 feature	 of	 these	 funds	 is	 that	 they	 are	 ring-fenced,	 and	 hence	
guaranteed,	 at	 the	 level	 of	 devolved	 administrations,	 for	 a	 seven-year	 period.	 The	 issue	 of	 EU	
funding	 is	 discussed	 further	 below.	 Finally,	 looking	 to	 economic	 considerations,	 the	 Single	Market	
has	a	particular	significance	for	Wales.	In	part,	this	is	because	Wales	is	a	small	nation	and	has	used	
its	 membership	 of	 the	 Single	 Market	 as	 a	 key	 selling	 point	 to	 secure	 Foreign	 Direct	 Investment.	
Furthermore,	unlike	the	UK	as	a	whole,	Wales	is	recorded	as	a	net	exporter	of	goods	to	the	EU	(HM	
Revenue	 and	 Customs	 2016;	 Woolford	 and	 Hunt	 2016a)	 and	 the	 EU	 is	 a	 particularly	 significant	
market	for	certain	products,	especially	food	and	drink	exports.	
	
‘TURKEYS	VOTING	FOR	CHRISTMAS’:	BREXIT	AND	THE	END	OF	EU	FUNDING	TO	WALES	
The	decision	of	 voters	 in	 some	of	 the	poorest	 areas	 of	Wales	 to	 vote	 Leave	 immediately	 led	 to	 a	
flurry	of	media	coverage	asking	why,	in	Wales,	the	‘turkeys	had	voted	for	Christmas’	(O’Hagan	2016;	
Wyn-Jones	2016).	Wales	after	all	enjoys	far	higher	levels	of	EU	funding	than	other	UK	regions	and	as	
a	result,	whilst	 the	UK	overall	 is	a	net	contributor	 to	the	EU	budget,	Wales	 is	a	net	beneficiary.4	A	
large	part	of	 this	 funding	comes	 through	 the	EU’s	Cohesion	Policy.	This	policy	originated	 from	the	
recognition	that	the	benefits	of	the	Single	Market	were	not	distributed	evenly	across	the	EU,	and	a	
redistributive	 mechanism	 to	 reduce	 regional	 disparities	 was	 created.	 Under	 the	 current	 funding	
programming	period,	running	from	2014-2020,	the	Welsh	Government	is	set	to	receive	(and	manage	
as	a	devolved	function)	more	than	300	million	EUR	per	year	from	the	EU	from	the	European	Regional	
Development	Fund	(ERDF)	and	the	European	Social	Fund	(ESF).	When	the	other	two	ESI	Funds5	are	
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incorporated	into	the	figure,	the	Welsh	Government	should	be	in	line	to	receive	more	than	3	billion	
EUR	by	 the	end	of	 the	2014-2020	programming	period	 (Woolford	and	Hunt	2016b).	Whilst	overall	
this	contribution	may	appear	minimal,	representing	only	0.4	per	cent	of	Welsh	GDP,	the	majority	of	
funding	 is	 concentrated	 in	 the	 ‘less-developed	 region’	 of	 West	 Wales	 and	 the	 Valleys.	 Wales	
comprises	two	separate	regions	for	EU	funding	purposes,	and,	with	a	GDP	below	75	per	cent	of	the	
EU	average,	West	Wales	and	the	Valleys	qualifies	for	the	highest	levels	of	EU	funding.6	This	suggests	
that	 a	 very	 significant	 impact	 could	 be	 felt	 locally	 in	 eligible	 areas.	 The	 amounts	 received	 by	 the	
more	 impoverished	 areas	 look	 all	 the	 more	 substantial	 when	 compared	 to	 other	 forms	 of	 UK	
regional	or	regeneration	funding.	
Unsurprisingly,	First	Minister	Carwyn	Jones	identified,	the	day	after	the	EU	referendum,	the	‘security	
of	funding	budgeted	under	EU	programmes’	as	one	of	the	six	key	priorities	for	Wales	in	the	context	
of	 Brexit	 (Welsh	Government	 2016a).	 Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 current	 Conservative	Government	
made	it	clear	 in	the	run	up	to	the	referendum,	that	there	would	be	no	guaranteed	replacement	of	
any	shortfall	in	EU	receipts	to	Wales	in	the	event	of	Brexit	(BBC	News	2016a;	Woolford	2016),	he	has	
continued	 to	argue	 for	a	 ‘full	guarantee’	 that	 funding	will	 continue	 for	existing	EU	programmes	 to	
2023.7	 Some	 assurance	 of	 continuity	 in	 the	 short	 term	 has	 been	 provided.8	 One	 of	 the	 biggest	
vulnerabilities	in	relation	to	ESIF	financial	allocations	and	their	potential	loss	to	Wales	is,	of	course,	
the	 timing	 and	 content	 of	 Article	 50	 withdrawal	 negotiations.	 With	 the	 triggering	 of	 Article	 50	
expected	 in	 March	 2017	 and	 a	 two-year	 withdrawal	 process	 provided	 for	 in	 the	 Treaties,	 UK	
membership	 of	 the	 EU	 will	 end	 in	 March	 2019.	 It	 is	 reasonable	 to	 assume	 that	 an	 end	 to	 EU	
budgetary	contributions	is	likely	to	coincide	with	the	withdrawal	of	ESIF	allocations	to	the	UK	which	
could	 lose	 Wales	 more	 than	 860m	 EUR	 of	 the	 2014-2020	 allocations.	 Potential	 future	 funding	
opportunities	from	the	policy	post-2020	will	also	be	missed	out	on9	as	will	funding	under	a	number	
of	other	related	instruments.10	
But	how	significant	 is	 this	 loss	 to	Wales?	 It	has	been	widely	 recognised	 that	 some	of	 the	areas	of	
Wales	that	have	received	the	most	significant	amounts	of	funding	from	the	EU	voted	with	the	largest	
margins	in	favour	of	Leave.	EU	funding	receipts	appeared	largely	irrelevant	to	Welsh	voters.	Was	this	
a	case	of	EU	regional	policy	failing	in	Wales,	or	was	its	communication	to	voters	ineffective	against	a	
‘Leave’	debate	that	suggested	EU	funding	was	 ‘our	money	anyway’?	The	Welsh	Secretary	of	State,	
Alun	Cairns,	was	quick	to	suggest	that	the	results	showed	that	those	purported	to	benefit	the	most	
from	European	aid	‘did	not	want	what	was	being	offered	to	them’	and	that	the	policy	had	not	been	
wholly	 successful,	 funding	 projects	with	 ‘questionable	 strategies	 and	woolly	 outcomes’.	 Repeated	
eligibility	 for	 the	 highest	 levels	 of	 funding	 suggests	 mismanagement	 by	 the	 Welsh	 Government,	
according	to	Mr	Cairns,	and	that	‘spending	according	to	the	same	old	plans	after	two	decades	is	not	
an	option	any	longer’	(BBC	News	2016b).	
These	criticisms	are	not	new.	Academics	have	previously	commented	on	the	tendency	of	the	region	
and	 its	 devolved	 government	 simply	 to	 repackage	 existing	 development	 approaches	 and	 policy	
priorities	 into	 ‘standard	EU	fare’	designed	to	absorb	European	funding	(Morgan	1997;	Pugh	2014).	
The	 higher	 funding	 levels	 in	 Wales	 have	 not	 led	 to	 greater	 performance	 or	 results	 against	 key	
economic	indicators	such	as	jobs	created	and	new	businesses	(Hunt,	Lavery,	Vittery	and	Berry	2016).	
In	 Wales,	 projects	 funded	 under	 the	 ERDF	 are	 estimated	 to	 have	 created	 36,640	 new	 jobs	 and	
11,900	new	businesses	in	the	2007-13	period.	The	equivalent	figures	for	Scotland,	where	the	Remain	
vote	 triumphed	 in	every	 local	 authority	 area,	 are	44,311	and	17,474	 respectively,	despite	 receipts	
amounting	to	36	per	cent	of	those	to	Wales.11	Questions	can	be	asked	as	to	whether	interventions	
that	 resulted	 in	 job	and	business	 creation	would	have	been	more	 relevant	 and	visible	 to	 targeted	
communities	 than	 the	 larger	 infrastructure	 projects	 that	 tend	 to	 be	 favoured	 under	 the	 Welsh	
programmes	(BBC	One	Wales).	The	choice	of	 intervention	is	strongly	correlated	with	the	 impact	of	
the	 funding,	with	people-focused	 interventions	 tending	 to	have	a	greater	 impact	 than	place-based	
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infrastructure	 investment	 (Becker	 2012).	 New	 models	 of	 delivery	 such	 as	 Community-Led	 Local	
Development	 (CLLD)	 that	 look	 to	 boost	 the	 impact	 of	 EU	 funding	 at	 the	 local	 level	 through	
cooperation,	engagement	and	cross-fund	 integration,	welcomed	 in	Scotland,	have	been	 ignored	 in	
programming	approaches	in	Wales,	where	conditions	would	make	them	particularly	relevant	(Farnet	
2015).	EU	funding,	of	course,	operates	in	a	broader	socio-economic	context.	External	developments,	
such	as	the	financial	crisis	and	subsequent	austerity	measures,	can	have	significant	impact	on	their	
delivery.	Economic	figures	show	that	many	of	the	local	authority	areas	voting	to	‘leave’	have	never	
recovered	 from	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 economic	 crisis	 and	 have	 lower	 GDP	 levels	 than	 in	 2000	
(StatsWales	2016).	
Whilst	the	effectiveness	of	the	use	of	the	funds	to	date	can	be	questioned,	their	loss	will	see	calls	for	
a	thorough	reassessment	of	the	mechanisms	under	which	public	finances	are	transferred	to	Wales.	
Carwyn	 Jones	 has	 called	 for	 a	 major	 and	 immediate	 revision	 of	 the	 Barnett	 Formula	 (Welsh	
Government	2016b).	UK	and	Welsh	economic	development	strategy	and	funding,	highly	aligned	with	
the	 broader	 EU	 policy	 framework,	 now	 stands	 at	 a	 junction.	 Whilst	 the	 Welsh	 Assembly	 and	
ministers	have	a	range	of	devolved	powers	to	promote	economic	development12	and	could	develop	
a	Welsh	regional	policy,	 it	seems	unlikely	based	on	financial	 resources	and	geographical	scale.	The	
UK	Parliament	retains	the	right	to	legislate	in	this	area	and	could	develop	a	UK-level	territorial	policy.	
Responses	 from	Westminster	 suggest	 that	 serious	 policy	 overhaul	 is	 likely.	 This	 could	 mean	 that	
regions	 are	 designated	 differently	 and	 that	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 policy,	 eligible	 activities,	 favoured	
regions	and	amounts	allocated	could	be	significantly	different.	The	potential	at	 least	exists	 for	 the	
design	of	more	tailored	policies	to	benefit	Wales.		
	
BREXIT	-	EXPANDING	THE	POWERS	OF	WALES?	
The	story	of	Welsh	devolution	has	been	one	of	incremental	shifts	in	the	responsibilities	and	powers	
from	Westminster	 and	Whitehall	 to	 Cardiff	 Bay.	 This	 has	 seen	 an	 expansion	 in	 both	 the	 range	 of	
policy	areas	devolved,	and	also	in	the	tools	and	techniques	available	to	the	Assembly	to	act.	Initially,	
on	the	coming	into	force	of	the	1998	Government	of	Wales	Act,	the	powers	granted	to	the	Assembly	
extended	only	 to	passing	secondary	 legislation	under	primary	acts	of	 the	Westminster	Parliament.	
This	was	in	contrast	to	the	situation	in	Scotland,	which	had	gained	primary	law	making	powers	for	its	
Parliament.	 These	 powers	 have	 been	 developed	 such	 that,	 by	 2011,	 the	Welsh	Assembly	 had	 the	
competence	 to	 adopt	 primary	 laws	 across	 twenty	 devolved	 areas,	 supplementing	more	 extensive	
executive	 powers	 held	 by	 the	Welsh	 Government.	 These	 powers	 run	 alongside	 those	 retained	 in	
London	to	 legislate	 for	Wales,	whether	as	part	of	UK-wide	 legislation	or	 through	more	 territorially	
targeted	measures,	subject	to	the	Sewel	Convention.13	
Amongst	the	areas	devolved	to	Wales	have	been	some	areas	which	have	been	heavily	Europeanised,	
with	a	decades-long	build-up	of	 regulatory	measures	at	EU	 level.	These	 include,	most	notably,	 the	
areas	of	agriculture	and	the	environment,	as	well	as	economic	development,	as	seen	above.	To	date,	
EU	law	has	set	the	parameters	for	the	exercise	of	Wales’s	powers	in	these	areas	(Morrow	2013)	and	
on	the	withdrawal	from	the	EU	of	the	UK,	such	constraints	may,	depending	on	the	new	relationship	
formed	with	 the	EU,	no	 longer	apply.	This	 could	 then	see	a	 transfer	of	 significant	 ‘real’	powers	 to	
Wales	 (and	 the	 other	 devolved	 administrations),	 taking	 them	 beyond	 the	 de	 facto	 powers	 of	
implementation	 defining	 their	 position	 so	 far	 –	 and,	 in	 those	 terms	 a	 ‘win’.	 However,	 the	 actual	
scope	for	the	exercise	of	those	powers	may	be	more	restricted	than	first	presumed.		
To	 take	 the	 example	 of	 the	 environment,	much	 EU	 environmental	 law	 is	 contained	 in	 directives,	
which	require	implementation	by	state	authorities.	These	have	been	transposed	both	at	UK	or	Wales	
level.	Differences	of	 approach	 (in	 terms	of	 administration,	 procedure,	 timing	 and	even	 substance)	
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are	possible	across	the	devolved	administrations	within	the	framework	of	EU	law,	and	a	distinctively	
Welsh	 approach	has	 emerged	 in	 a	 number	 of	 areas.	 There	 is,	 for	 example,	 a	 statutory	 duty	 upon	
Welsh	ministers	to	promote	sustainable	development	in	all	their	business	and	ensure	a	scheme	for	
its	 implementation	 (Government	of	 the	UK	2008),	 further	enhanced	 through	 the	Wellbeing	Power	
(ibid),	 which	 authorises	Welsh	ministers	 to	 do	 anything	 they	 consider	 appropriate	 to	 promote	 or	
improve	the	‘economic,	social	and	environmental	wellbeing	of	Wales’	(see	also	Government	of	the	
UK	2015).	More	 specifically,	 there	has	been	Welsh	 implementation	of	EU	measures	differing	 from	
that	undertaken	elsewhere	in	the	UK,	on	such	matters	as	elements	of	waste	legislation	and	nitrate	
pollution.	At	the	same	time	however,	the	UK	Government	seeks	to	achieve	consistency	of	effect.	In	
some	cases	EU	environmental	law	has	been	jointly	implemented	across	the	UK14	in	order	to	ensure	
coherence,	so	that	the	UK	meets	national	targets	and	standards,	as	well	as	for	political	or	resource	
reasons.		
In	the	event	of	Brexit,	as	environmental	policy	is	devolved	to	Wales	under	the	current	UK	devolution	
settlement,	 responsibility	 for	 this	area	would	 return	 to	Wales.	Wales’s	approach	 to	environmental	
laws	may	then	see	it	choose15	to	deregulate,	or	refine	existing	laws,	or	maintain	those	existing	laws	
and	voluntarily	 incorporate	future	laws	coming	from	the	EU.	However,	as	is	currently	the	case,	the	
Westminster	Parliament	would	still	have	powers	to	legislate	for	Wales,	and	steps	may	be	envisaged	
domestically	to	promote	a	common	approach	across	policy	areas.	There	are,	after	all,	a	number	of	
negative	 consequences	 associated	 with	 too	 much	 diversity	 or	 divergence	 from	 neighbouring	
jurisdictions	 in	 the	 area	 of	 environmental	 policy,	 whether	 at	 UK	 level	 or	 between	 the	 devolved	
administrations.	 For	 example,	 energy	policy	 could	be	problematic	 in	 the	 case	of	Brexit	 due	 to	 the	
interconnections	across	different	national	markets.	Furthermore,	a	number	of	requirements	within	
this	 field	 of	 law	 stem	 from	other	 international	 legal	 obligations	 to	which	 the	UK	 is	 party.	Wales’s	
freedom	 of	 action	 could	 thus	 also	 be	 constrained	 by	 obligations	 arising	 from	 international	 law.	
Finally,	there	are	very	real	questions	around	Wales’s	capacity	to	absorb	swathes	of	additional	policy-
making	 responsibility.	 This	 includes	 not	 only	 infrastructure	 and	 institutional	 aspects,	 but	 also,	 as	
seen	 most	 clearly	 in	 the	 regional	 development	 example,	 the	 financial	 costs	 that	 are	 attached	 to	
certain	policies.		
	
CONCLUSION	
Wales	emerged	on	the	winning	side	of	the	EU	referendum.	Against	the	backdrop	of	overwhelming	
political	support	for	continued	EU	membership, this	small,	left-leaning	nation	–	a	net	beneficiary	of	
EU	membership	and	conventionally	understood	 to	be	pro-European –	voted	Leave. At	 the	 time	of	
writing,	 much	 hangs	 in	 the	 balance.	 What	 is	 certain,	 however,	 is	 that	 the	 UK’s	 exit	 from	 the	
European	Union	will	 echo	 down	 generations.	Whatever	 variant	 of	 Brexit	 finally	 agreed,	 the	 legal,	
political	and	economic	implications	will	be	considerable	–	although	more	significantly	pronounced	in	
the	case	of	a	‘hard	Brexit’.	As	part	of	this,	Wales	will	have	its	own	Brexit	story	to	tell.	This	story	will	
reflect	Wales’s	distinct	relationship	with	the	EU	as	well	as	its	(unsettled)	devolution	settlement,	itself	
developed	 in	 the	context	of	 the	UK’s	EU	membership.	Brexit	 in	Wales	will	play	out	along	multiple	
lines	 (political	 and	 legal,	 cultural,	 financial	 and	economic)	 and	 the	Welsh	Government	will	 seek	 to	
defend	the	Welsh	national	interest	on	these	fronts	in	the	Brexit	negotiations.	This,	however,	will	be	
set	against	the	background	of	the	Welsh	public’s	rejection	of	the	European	status	quo.	
Under	current	constitutional	arrangements,	as	EU	frameworks	are	lifted,	Wales	will	claim	ownership	
of	vast	swathes	of	 law	making.	On	the	one	hand,	this	may	be	seen	as	another	‘win’	for	Wales	as	it	
will	be	able	 to	develop	 its	own	 legal,	policy	and	 regulatory	 regimes,	 free	 from	the	constraints	and	
limitations	 of	 EU	 law	 (although	 still	 subject	 to	 other	 international	 obligations).	 On	 the	 other,	 this	
raises	 huge	 capacity	 issues	 as	 Welsh	 political	 and	 administrative	 institutions	 are	 loaded	 with	
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significant	additional	burdens.	Of	course,	this	will	only	be	the	case	if	Wales	can	successfully	defend	
its	 policy	 territory	 from	 the	 centralising	 forces	 of	Westminster.	 The	 story	 of	 Brexit	 in	Wales	 is	 far	
from	 clear-cut.	 It	 is	 a	 complex	 story	 of	 disruption and	 division,	 and	 one	 in	 which	 there	 will	 be	
winners	and	losers.	
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ENDNOTES		
1	Initially,	on	24	June,	this	included	a	commitment	to	the	continuation	to	the	free	movement	of	people.	This	commitment	
was	later	dropped	and	removed	from	the	English	version	of	the	press	release.		
2	64.8	per	cent	voted	Remain	in	1975,	against	a	UK	wide	Remain	vote	of	67.5	per	cent.	
3	On	Welsh	soft	nationalism,	see	Moon	2013.	
4	Calculated	at	79	GBP	per	person	per	annum	(Ifan,	Poole	and	Wyn	Jones	2016)		
5	European	Agricultural	Fund	for	Regional	Development	and	European	Maritime	and	Fisheries	Fund.	
6	And	has	done	for	three	programming	rounds,	from	2000-2006;	2007-2013;	and	now	2014-2020.	
7	Under	EU	rules,	funds	can	be	spent	up	to	three	years	following	allocation.		
8	A	guarantee	has	been	given	by	the	Treasury	to	fund	those	projects	agreed	by	devolved	administrations	which	represent	
good	value	 for	money	and	close	alignment	with	domestic	 strategic	priorities.	There	 is	as	yet	 little	 clarity	as	 to	how	that	
would	be	measured	or	defined.	
9	Recognising	that	the	level	of	funding	available	would	likely	be	reduced	from	the	current	programming	period.	
10	 For	 example,	 through	access	 to	 the	Connecting	 Europe	 Facility	 and	 the	European	Fund	 for	 Strategic	 Investments	 and	
future	loan	financing	from	the	European	Investment	Bank.	
11	The	combined	ERDF	and	European	Structural	Fund	allocation	to	Scotland	for	2007-2013	was	820	million	EUR	compared	
to	2,218	million	EUR	for	Wales	(Hunt,	Lavery,	Vittery	and	Berry	2016).	
12	See	variously	Government	of	Wales	Act	2006,	Schedule	7;	Welsh	Development	Agency	Act	1975.		
13	 Disputes	 do	 occur	 –	 see,	 for	 example,	 the	 successful	 challenge	 to	 a	 non-devolved	 removal	 of	 the	Agricultural	Wages	
Board,	through	a	robust	and	expansive	reading	of	Welsh	competence	by	the	Supreme	Court,	[2014]	UKSC	43.		
14	Eg	Waste	Electrical	and	Electronic	Equipment	Regulations	2013,	implementing	Directive	2012/19/EU.	
15	On	an	assumption	that	the	proposed	‘Great	Repeal	Act’	acknowledges	the	role	of	the	Devolved	Nations	in	the	ongoing	
review	of	which	EU	laws	to	remove.		
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